In the last few years, preference logic and in particular, the dynamic logic of preference change, has suddenly become a live topic in my Amsterdam and Stanford environments.
we have discussed here, that our basic 'order logic' is a wide-ranging pilot environment for studying essential patterns in reasoning with preference and belief. 
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Defining global propositional preference
As we have said, a betterness relation need not yet determine what we mean by agents' preferences in some more colloquial sense. Indeed, many authors consider 'preference' really a relation between propositions, with von Wright 1963 as a famous example. These differences seem largely terminological, which is precisely why debates are often bitter.
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Set lifting Technically, defining preferences between propositions calls for a comparison of sets of worlds. For a given relation ≤ among worlds, this may be achieved by lifting.
One ubiquitous proposal in relation lifting, also elsewhere, is the ∀∃ stipulation that a set Y is preferred to a set X if ∀x∈X ∃y∈Y: x ≤ y.
As we said, this was axiomatized by Halpern 1997 philosophy, computer science), but no consensus on one canonical notion of preference seems to have ever emerged. This may be a feature, rather than a bug. Preference as a comparison relation between propositions may turn out different depending on the scenario. For instance, in a game, when comparing sets of outcomes that can be reached by selecting available moves, players may have different options. One would indeed say that we prefer a set whose minimum utility value exceeds the maximum of another (this 7 We have not even exhausted all approaches cooking in Amsterdam right now. For another kind of modal preference logic in games, including a 'normality' operator, see Apt & Zvesper 2007. 8 Compare William James' famous squirrel going 'round' the tree (or not…): cf. James 1907.
is like the ∀∀ reading) -but it would also be quite reasonable to say that the maximum of one set exceeds the maximum of the other, which would be rather like the ∀∃ reading.
Extended modal logics
The main insight from the current modal literature on preference is two-fold. First, many different liftings are definable in our modal base logic extended with a universal modality Uϕ: 'ϕ is true in all worlds'. This standard feature from 'hybrid logic' gives some additional expressive power without great cost in the modal model theory and the computational complexity of valid consequence. For instance, the ∀∃ reading of preference is expressed as follows, with formulas for definable sets of worlds:
In what follows, we will use the notation Pϕψ for such lifted propositional preferences.
Of course, eventually, one can also use stronger formalisms for describing preferences, such as first-order logic (cf. Suppes 1957), but this is just the ordinary balance in logic between finding illuminating formalizations of key notions and argument patterns, and the quest for formalisms combining optimal expressivity with computational ease. 9 We have nothing against richer languages, but modal logic is an attractive first level to start.
Dynamics of evaluation change
But now for preference change! A modal model describes a current evaluation pattern for worlds, as seen by one or more agents. But the reality is that these patterns are not stable.
Things can happen which make us change these evaluations of worlds. This dynamic idea has been in the air for quite while now. 
Note that this model change event is a function, providing unique values for each M, w.
Next, we enrich the formal language by adding action modalities interpreted as follows:
These allow us to talk about what agents will prefer after their comparison relation has changed. For instance, if you tell me to drink beer rather than wine, and I accept this, then I now come to prefer beer over wine, even if I did not do so before. Now, as in dynamic-epistemic logic, the heart of the dynamic analysis consists in finding the 'recursion equation' explaining when a preference obtains after an action, in so far as the language can express it. Here is the relevant valid principle for suggestions, whose two cases can be seen to follow the above definition of the above model change:
Theorem The dynamic logic of preference change under suggestions is axiomatized completely by the static modal logic of the underlying model class plus the following equivalences for the dynamic modality: For instance, let ⇑(ϕ) be the relation change which makes all ϕ-worlds better than all ¬ϕ-worlds, while keeping the old order inside these zones. In preference terms, this makes ϕ the 'most desirable good', while in terms of belief revision , it is a piece of 'soft information' making the ϕ-worlds the most plausible ones -though still leaving a loop hole for ¬ϕ perhaps being true. Again, we can find a complete recursion axiom for this notion, this time as follows, using an 'existential modality' E:
General relation transformers
15 14 This reductive analysis shows that the process of preference can be analyzed compositionally.
Moreover, it shows that the base language was well-designed, in 'expressive harmony' with the dynamic superstructure. Even so, the real dynamic account of preference change is of course in the recursive procedure itself, and it lies only hidden implicitly in the base language.
15 Van Benthem 2007A uses this axiom to analyze agents' conditional beliefs after receiving soft information, with a recursion based on the definition of such beliefs in our modal base language.
But in principle, there can be many further triggers for betterness change, depending on how people adjust to what others claim, command, etc. Thus, it is hard to specify just a small set of changes, with logic serving as an arbiter of how one should respond to them.
The task of a dynamic logic of preference is rather providing the appropriate generality, and spotting where some 'trigger' needs to be provided as input to the update.
16
Here is one way of achieving parametrization of preference change. The new betterness relations in our examples are definable from the old ones in the following straightforward syntactic 'PDL program format', involving test, sequential composition and union:
ϕ ; R ; ?ϕ) ∪ (?¬ϕ ; R ; ?¬ϕ) ∪ (?¬ϕ ; T ; ?ϕ)
where 'T' is the universal relation in the model.
Note that the former definition can only go to a sub-relation of the current one, while the second may add new links as well. Both types fall under the following result:
Theorem Any relation transformer τ with a program definition in the PDL format has a complete reduction axiom which can be computed effectively from τ's definition.
The proof is a simple recursive recipe, viewing the definitions basically as 'substitutions'
of new relations for old. There are also other ways of achieving generality, e.g., in terms of 'event models' (see Section 10 below), but the program method, too, is powerful. instructions like ⇑(ϕ) as 'see to it that you come to prefer, or believe, that ϕ'. This is a forward-oriented view of dynamics: one should make some minimal change resulting in the truth of some stated 'postcondition'. But this is not really the spirit of dynamicepistemic logic, which rather lets events tell us the 'preconditions' of their occurrence.
The two views clash, e.g., in deontic logic, when a command says that you must make sure some proposition becomes true without telling you how. In principle, our approach is 'constructive': triggers in the logic must tell us exactly how the model is to be changed.
For the other view, temporal logics (Belnap et al. 2001 , van Benthem & Pacuit 2006 may be the better format, where the model already gives the possible future histories.
Theorem The orders produced via linear 'priority sequences' are precisely the total ones with reflexivity, transitivity, and quasi-linearity:∀xyz:
Liu 2008 discusses this situation further, and notes that the literature has many other ways of defining object order from property orders, which can be studied in similar ways.
This diversity may be compared with that for 'lifting' object order to world order before.
Dynamics Again, this style of analysis suggests an obvious engine for preference change.
This time, it is the priority order and set of relevant properties which can change, thereby inducing a changing in the defined object order. A new criterion may become relevant, or a criterion may lose its former importance. De Jongh & Liu study four main operations:
permuting properties in a priority sequence, prefixing a new property, postfixing a new property, and inserting a property at some specified position. Together, these allow for any manipulation of finite sequences. Moreover, they lead to complete dynamic logics for the changed derived object-level preferences after such changes have taken place first at the level of the prioritized properties. The format is borrowed from the earlier modal one, and therefore, we do not repeat the precise results here. What all this does show is that the style of dynamification in earlier sections also works for first-order logics, making our modal setting a convenience, rather than a straightjacket.
One interesting thing is that the priority dynamics has its own intuitions, different from the account of 'suggestions' or 'commands' we had before. between the dynamics at the two levels. In particular, she shows that prefixing of propositions ϕ to a current priority sequence P has the same effect as the earlier relation transformer ⇑(ϕ). More precisely, writing the lexicographic derivation of object order as a function lex, the following identity holds, making the following diagram commute:
lex(ϕ ; P) = ⇑(ϕ) (lex(P))
Again, the general theory of inducing dynamics from one level to another seems open.
There also seems to be room here for a more general calculus of natural operations on priority sequences, called 'agenda algebra' in the dissertation Girard 2008. 22 21 Nevertheless, as we said before, a priority order is not necessarily a preference order. 22 For instance, for each set of properties, there is a set of disjoint properties generating the
Further aspects of preference: ceteris paribus logic
All our logics so far, whether betterness-or priority-based, described pure preferences. Normality versus equality First, the term 'ceteris paribus', though widely used, has no unambiguous meaning. In fact, one can distinguish two main views. In many scenarios, the normality sense says that we only make the preference comparison 'under normal circumstances'. I prefer beer over wine, but not when dining at the Paris Ritz. This may be modeled by the 'normal' or most plausible worlds' of our current model. These worlds are singled out, either by some explicit description N, or just as the most plausible worlds in some doxastic plausibility order. In the former scenario, our earlier logic still suffices.
We could express a global preference Pϕψ in this normality sense as
P(N&ϕ)(N&ψ).
But this approach by explicit definition of normal worlds will not work in general, and then we must use models with both betterness and plausibility orders, as in Lang, van der
Torre & Weydert 2003, with some matching combined logic of preference and belief. We will return to this issue of what may be called 'entanglement' in the next Section.
For now, we note that there is also another equality sense of 'ceteris paribus': indeed, the one favoured by von Wright. In this sense, a preference statement is made globally, though under the proviso that certain propositions do not change their truth values. For instance, someone who generally prefers work over vacation, might still be said to prefer night over day with work/vacation 'frozen' in a 'ceteris paribus', even though there are same object order. Finding the latter effectively is a matter of merging Boolean normal form principles with some preference logic. A few first principles are found in the cited references.
vacation days that she would prefer to work nights. More precisely, for von Wright, a ceteris paribus preference for ϕ over ψ with respect to some proposition A means that both (i) among the A-worlds I prefer ϕ over ψ, and (ii) among the ¬A-worlds I prefer ϕ over ψ. equality-based ceteris paribus preferences an explicit part of the language, making reasoners specify explicitly which propositions are to be 'frozen' in their comparisons.
Thus, cross-comparisons between the
They give a modal logic CPL extending basic preference logic with operators
M, s |= [Γ]
≤ ϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all t with s ≡ Γ t and s ≤ t,
< ϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all t with s ≡ Γ t and s < t.
Then an Γ-equality-based ceteris paribus preference Pϕψ can be defined, e.g., as follows:
belief revision by Baltag & Smets 2006 , and van Eijck's Note in Apt & van Rooij, eds., 2008. 28 Intersection really played already with the ceteris paribus logic CPL, where betterness became intersected with truth-value equivalence for a formula set Γ.
Again, completely similar points hold for belief instead of knowledge, using intersection modalities with respect to betterness and plausibility relations between worlds.
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Dynamic informational actions then include both announcements of hard information and various sorts of plausibility-changing 'soft information' that trigger belief revision.
Third degree of entanglement: preference and belief as duals Finally, all this piecemeal modal combination might still be too simple and technically driven. Preference and belief may also be taken to be totally inter-definable notions, and much of the literature on the suggests that we can learn a person's beliefs from her preferences, as revealed by her actions 30 -and also vice versa, that we can learn her preferences from her beliefs. We leave the pros and cons of this conceptual connection as an open problem, which actually highlights the broader challenge of relating preference logic to decision theory.
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Multi-agent interaction and group preference
As a final topic which I see as central to preference logic, I want to mention another feature of information dynamics which also makes sense for preference, viz. its multiagent interactive character which also involves an analysis of groups as new agents in their own right. For a start, let us look at the most obvious interactive test-bed for logics of preference and information, making the earlier issues much more concrete, viz. games. available about their 'intentions', i.e., the strategies that they will play from now on. Van
Benthem 2007B discusses the role of 'promises' in games, viewed in a similar way as public announcements of intentions, while also discussing related settings where players' preferences (encoded as betterness relations on nodes in the game tree) are not known.
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The entanglement of knowledge and belief with betterness and preference becomes quite concrete and vivid in this setting. Consider the well-known game solution procedure of Backward Induction. In the following picture, an equilibrium with outcomes (1, 0) will be computed by inductive bottom-up reasoning about players' 'rationality' -incidentally, making both hugely worse off than the cooperative outcome (99, 99):
0, 100 99, 99
As pointed out in Board 1998 , van Benthem 2002 , the reasoning behind the standard Nash equilibrium here really rests on deriving expectations from the given betterness relations among end nodes, and then choosing moves accordingly. More concretely, there are three worlds, one for each complete history of the game, and the backward induction reasoning creates a plausibility ordering among these, which is actually the same for both players, with the world of (1, 0) on top, then that with (0, 100) and then that with (99, 99) . Thus in games, the plausibility relations that we merely stipulate in models for belief revision arise from an underlying analysis connecting belief with preference.
But we also see that this entanglement between belief and preference is not 'absolute'. It depends crucially on assumptions that we make about the type of agent involved. One can only predict beliefs from people's preferences by assuming, for instance, that they are 31 Changes in games may improve their equilibria. E.g., in the game that follows, E might promise that she will not go left, and this public announcement changes the game to one with just the 'right' move for her -and a new equilibrium (99, 99) results.
rational utility-maximizing agents in the sense of decision theory or game theory.
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Thus, I
am not yet convinced that preference and belief are truly dual notions, as a majority view seems to have it. They rather seem like separate notions to me, though they may be connected tightly through making different assumptions on agents. And it would rather be a task for preference logic to sort out what natural assumptions are, in addition to the ubiquitous 'rationality', and how they may become subject to explicit reasoning.
Preferences and intentions Much more sophisticated scenarios are discussed in the dissertation Roy 2008, which is an extensive logic-inspired study of the role of intentions and commitments in decision making and game playing. Rational intentions are based on preferences, but they add further aspects of agents' capabilities and their plans for achieving goals, which are beyond our simple preference-based logic frameworks so far.
While these richer models are definitely worthwhile, they lie beyond our horizon here.
Preference merge and group modalities While games still involve interaction between individual agents by themselves, the next obvious step is to introduce groups themselves as new collective agents. Indeed, game theorists study coalitions, while in epistemic and doxastic logic, common knowledge or common belief of groups has become a standard notion in understanding stable behaviour in communication and interaction. The naturally corresponding issue in preference logic would be how group preferences arise out of individual ones. This issue has also come up in belief revision theory, under the name of 'belief merge' for groups of agents who need to merge their plausibility relations.
A highly sophisticated paradigm for relation merge among many agents is that proposed Incidentally, in this setting, it is crucial to make betterness comparisons with worlds that we believe will not happen: it is precisely those worlds which keep the actual prediction 'in place'. 33 Thus, either x comes below y, or if not, y 'compensates' for this by doing better on some comparison relation in the set with a higher priority in the graph. As for dynamics in this new two-level perspective, there are some natural operations for changing and combining priority graphs, viz. their sequential and parallel composition.
These lead to an elegant calculus of graph operations and their induced group preference relations. This may be viewed as a compositional logical calculus of group preference, much richer than the simple set-based approaches which have been around in the literature -and it applies equally well to preference formation as belief merge.
Dynamics of social choice
All this points at a junction between preference logic including group preferences and social choice theory. This is indeed where things seem to be heading these days. Preference logics with group preferences seem to be the natural counterpart to epistemic logics with various forms of group knowledge, and taken together, they provide a rich account of groups that can learn and form new preferences.
Of course, much remains to be understood concerning the fine-structure of informative actions for groups, the ways in which they deliberate, and the ways in which agents are subject to preference change. These include at least two processes: (a) adjustment of one's initial preferences through social encounters, and (b) even leaving initial individual preferences intact, joining in the formation of new groups with preferences of their own.
The empirical reality of voting procedures, and rules for rational discussion and debate would seem to provide excellent challenges for extended preference logic in this sense.
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Conclusions and further issues
We have given an overview of dynamic logics of preference change as being developed in Amsterdam, first for individual agents, and eventually also for groups of agents. Many topics have been suppressed in this sketch 34 , such as the use of product update (Baltag & Smets 2006) as a congenial but different methodology, numerical plausibility and utility change (dating back to Aucher 2003) , and in particular, connections and contrasts with probability and decision theory. As to the latter, so far, nothing in our preference logics, 'entangled' or not, matches the role of expected value in decision and game theory, where utilities of alternative options are weighed probabilistically. How serious is this limitation? Does it relegate preference logic, no matter how broad and 'dynamic', to the side-lines forever? We do not know, but we do think that the presentation given here links preference logic in its traditional guise to exciting new developments in logic, computation, belief revision, and social choice theory (cf. Endriss & Lang, eds., 2005) .
And maybe that is quite enough for one paper.
